Tender/Contract Corruption Crimes in Ethiopia: Evidences from Convicted Court Cases

  • Afework Alemayehu Gobena Hawassa University, Ethiopia
  • Taye Negussie Addis Ababa University, Ethiopia
  • Pietro Toggia Kutztown University, USA
Keywords: corruption crime, court cases, economy, sociological theory, tender/contract

Abstract

In a wider qualitative study concerned with corruption crimes in Ethiopia, there are only 16 which are about tender/contract corruption crimes. This study dealt only with these corruption crimes, based on court case files in which defendants were found guilty. The crimes were committed as medium or top level government and private organizations’ officials competed for livelihood goals. To corruptly increase own income or profit, the officials used authority and qualification, manipulated bureaucratic rules, regulations and decisions. They further exploited the free market (money) economy in which items of exchange are not delivered immediately; illegal means of earning the ‘charming’ money or owning other valuable assets remains unquestioned, self-control and ethical concerns have been minimized. The criminals owned properties contrary to socially approved ways while the high monetary values the crimes involved- one to several millions- implied that the criminals reaped huge amounts of kickbacks. The article further argues that these corruption crimes, though committed for economic benefits, could not be considered economic actions. To minimize tender/contract corruption crimes, it is recommended to reward public officials with “secure existence” by means of salaries regularly revised in accordance with inflation and corruption controlling coercive laws at least partially redirected to social sanctions.

Published
2024-01-25
How to Cite
Gobena, A., Negussie, T., & Toggia, P. (2024). Tender/Contract Corruption Crimes in Ethiopia: Evidences from Convicted Court Cases. Ethiopian Journal of Science and Sustainable Development, 11(1), 58-69. https://doi.org/10.20372/ejssdastu:v11.i1.2024.581
Section
Articles